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The Differences that Make a
Difference
William James on the Importance of Individuals
Susan Haack
AUTHOR'S NOTE
My thanks to Mark Migotti for very helpful comments on a draft, and to Pamela Lucken
and David Wilson for their help in finding relevant material.
An unlearned carpenter of my acquaintance once
said in my hearing: “There is very little difference
between one man and another; but what little
there is, is very important.” – William James (1890)1
1 On the question of  “the individual  and the community in pragmatism,” most  people
would probably think first of Dewey’s influential ideas about the individual and society:
his conception of education as preparation for responsible citizenship,2 perhaps, or his
critique of the “ragged individualism” of unbridled capitalism.3 But, because my work has
focused primarily on logic,  epistemology, metaphysics,  philosophy of science, and the
like, the first topic that came to my mind was Peirce’s complaint about the “pernicious”
individualism of Descartes’s criterion of truth,4 and the role of the community in his own
theory of inquiry. And I hope, one day, to return to the task of tracking how Peirce’s
pragmati[ic]ist understanding of truth and reality in terms of the community of inquirers
grew from the seeds to be found in his 1868 anti-Cartesian papers;5 and maybe, also, to
explore the parallels,  and the divergences,  between Peirce’s critique of Descartes and
James’s6 – or try to get to the bottom of Peirce’s intriguing idea that a solution to the
problem of  induction  requires  us  to  acknowledge  that  “logic  depends  on  the  social
principle.”7
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2 But for the present occasion I have decided to take a quite different tack, beginning with
the ideas  expressed in a  short  paper  in which James reflects  on “the importance of
individuals.” Until now, I hadn’t paid much attention to the context in which this paper
of James’s appeared, but had simply enjoyed it as a free-standing piece – relishing its
shrewdness about human beings and their idiosyncracies, and finding it a marvelously
bracing antidote to the pseudo-sophisticated sneering at “individualism” fashionable in
recent decades. Re-reading this paper now, and paying closer attention to its context, I
still  found  it  just  as  delightfully  human  and  just  as  psychologically  shrewd  as  I
remembered; but I also discovered that it has much more philosophical and historical
substance than I had previously realized. This both raised some questions about James’s
arguments, and gave the present project a whole new twist.
3 For this little paper of James’s was just a small part of his contribution to the debate over
the role of great men in history – a debate which, as an editor of Thomas Carlyle’s On
Heroes,  Hero-Worship,  and  the  Heroic  in  History  observes,  was  “a  major  Victorian
preoccupation.”8 In  1880,  James  had  published  a  long  article  on  “Great  Men,  Great
Thoughts, and Their Environment,”9 largely devoted to criticizing an idea he attributes to
Herbert Spencer and his followers: that great men are simply the product of their society.
On  the  contrary,  James  argued:  just  as  natural  selection  can  explain  what  causes  a
mutation to be preserved or to die out, but cannot explain what brings the mutations
about initially, so sociology can explain the forces that preserve or destroy great men, but
cannot explain what produces great men in the first place. This paper prompted two
replies, one from John Fiske,10 and another from an admirer of Spencer’s called Grant
Allen.11 Fiske argued that James’s Spencer was a straw man – the real Herbert Spencer had
never denied the role of individuals.12 Allen, however, defended quite a strong social-
determinist position. “The Importance of Individuals” is James’s reply to Allen’s reply to
his earlier paper.13
4 Of course, Peirce also took an interest in the subject of “great men”; and this suggests
that it might be fruitful to compare James’s ideas with Peirce’s researches – which, as we
know from his notes for his class on this subject at Johns Hopkins University, he tackled
from a distinctively statistical angle that seems, at first blush, markedly at odds with
James’s  intuitive,  anecdotal  approach.  Moreover,  though  there  is  nothing  explicitly
epistemological in “The Importance of Individuals,” James’s earlier piece, “Great Men and
Their Environment,” is in part concerned to stress that significant intellectual advances
and discoveries  are  not,  as  James  took Spencer  to  claim,  predetermined by external
forces, but, on the contrary, require “flashes of genius in the individual head.”14 And this
suggests that it might be fruitful to compare James’s ideas about the role of individual
thinkers  in  the  community  of  inquirers  with  Peirce’s  stress  on  the  individual’s
vulnerability to ignorance and error.
5 Both comparisons, it turns out, open up the attractive possibility of combining insights
from James and from Peirce. So, after a brief commentary on James’s paper, I will argue
first that, despite their very different emphases, a full treatment of “the question of great
men” might reconcile elements of James’s approach with elements of Peirce’s; and then
that a complete theory of inquiry will surely need to accommodate both the individual
contributions  that  James  stresses,  and  the  social  mechanisms  of  correction  and
adjustment that Peirce highlights.
⁂
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6 As  Peirce  wrote  of  his  old  friend  in  a  tribute  shortly  after  his  death,  James’s
“comprehension of men to the very core was most wonderful.”15 Indeed: James had a
remarkably shrewd and sympathetic understanding of what makes human beings tick;
and “The Importance of Individuals” is a fine example of this understanding at work, as
his marvelous quotation from his carpenter friend is of his keen ear for the mot juste.
7 Grant Allen, to whom James is responding, was primarily concerned to explore what we
might call  “national  character.”  Trying to understand why western civilization arose
where and when it did, he stressed the geography and climate of ancient Greece, its busy
mercantile culture, and so on.16 He was impressed by the vast differences between the
ancient Greeks and their contemporaries in Egypt, or in China – and played down the
differences among the Greeks, among the Egyptians, among the Chinese. The difference
between the mind of a Plato or an Aristotle or a Zeno and the ordinary Greek mind, he
suggested, is petty by comparison with the difference between the Greek mind and the
Chinese or the Egyptian mind.
8 James  thinks  this  completely  wrong-headed.  Trying  at first  to  be  as  conciliatory  as
possible, he begins as if the disagreement were simply a matter of emphasis: that, while
Mr. Allen is interested in the large differences between “tribes,” he is more concerned
with the small differences between the great man and the ordinary run of his tribe. But as
he gives his “personal reasons” for emphasizing individual differences, James reveals that
there is much more at stake than a mere difference of emphasis: for he not only suggests
that  an adequate  philosophy should accommodate  both kinds  of  difference,  but  also
objects  to  the  assumption “that  the  mere  size  of  a  difference  is  capable  of  deciding
whether that difference be or be not a fit subject for philosophy.”17 In fact, he continues,
Allen’s emphasis is invidious, even perverse: the differences that most interest us are
precisely those we don’t take for granted: not the very large differences between our dog
and our human friends,  for  example,  but  the much smaller  differences among those
friends – or the even smaller differences between the ablest students in a class and the
dullest. Moreover, James continues, it is the very fact that they interest us that makes
these differences important: “the preferences of sentient creatures create the importance
of topics.”18 And anyway, he argues, Allen is blind to a crucial point: that “[t]he zone of
the individual differences, and of the social ‘twists’ which […] they initiate, is the zone of
formative processes, […] the line where past and future meet.” But it is exactly here that
we see the differences among tribes or nations “in the making.” So, James concludes, since
the differences among tribes come about in part because of the actions and ideas of great
men, Allen’s approach has things exactly backwards.19
9 Ingenious as this line of argument is, it is not, I think, entirely fair to Mr. Allen. True, as
James  says,  Allen  stresses  the  distinctive  casts  of  mind  he  believes  characteristic  of
different nations or tribes, and the role of the environment, especially of geography, in
determining national  character;  true,  as  James says,  Allen maintains that,  if  Plato or
Shakespeare  or  (his  example)  Robert  Clive20 had died young, 21 the  environment  that
produced  him  would  have  produced  another  great  man  of  the  same  type.  “Our
circumstances have, unhappily, created amongst us a class of Bob Clive begetters,” Allen
writes; “and whenever there is a Zululand or an Afghanistan to annex, so Sir Bartle Frere
is forthcoming at once to annex it.”22 But James doesn’t mention that Allen also points
out, in response to the analogy that he had drawn with natural selection, that there is
nothing in Darwin to suggest that mutations are mysterious, uncaused, or inexplicable.23
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10 Nor does James note that Allen grants that an individual’s special talents or genius will be
explicable in part by heredity, but then argues that the environment is also responsible,
albeit indirectly, for the hereditary element. For, while in very homogeneous societies
where “every man’s life closely resembles every other man’s” every child will inherit “a
brain and nervous system of the relatively fixed ancestral type,” in a very heterogeneous
society where different people live very differently there will be “numberless varieties of
functionally  acquired  brain  elements”  to  be  inherited.24 This  argument  seems  to
presuppose  both  a  kind  of  functionalist  conception  of  mind  and,  apparently,  the
heritability of acquired mental capacities; on neither of which, disappointingly, James
makes any comment.
11 Moreover, one might well feel a little uncomfortable about the way James ups the ante –
shifting, in the course of a few pages, from noting a difference of emphasis, to suggesting
that his is the really important topic and the matters on which Allen focuses relatively
trivial,  and  from  there  to  the  very  strong  claim  that  Allen’s  approach  inverts  the
appropriate scientific procedure. Still, a more sympathetic reading might recognize these
rhetorical  maneuvers  as  James’s  way of  leading us  away from Allen’s  stress  on “the
ancient Greek mind,” “the ancient Chinese mind,” etc., and back to what he believes to be
the root of the problem: the inadequacy of “the contemporary sociological school,” with
its  focus  on  “averages  and  general  laws  and  predetermined  tendencies,”  and  “its
obligatory undervaluing of the importance of individual differences.”25
12 As this suggests, what James had presented in “Great Men and Their Environment” as
objections to sociology are really objections, not to the scientific study of society, as such,
but  to  a  particular  style  of  sociological  study,  the  style  James  attributes,  rightly  or
wrongly, to Spencer: sociological study focused exclusively on “external circumstances”
such  as  geography,  climate,  etc.,  and  taking  for  granted  that  these  are  sufficient  to
determine social development, including the production of the great men of any place or
time. So James’s contrast between “sociology” and “hero-worship” is more than a little
misleading: the real point is not that the emergence of great men is wholly outside the
scope of scientific study, but that such study would require a very different, and much
subtler, approach.
13 James is of course correct in saying that Darwin’s theory of natural selection explains why
some of the random mutations that arise are preserved and others die out, but not why
they arise in the first place. But, as Allen had already pointed out, it doesn’t follow (and
neither,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  does  Darwin  ever  suggest)  that  the  causes  of  these
mutations are inherently beyond the reach of science. James is also correct in saying that,
while sociological generalizations may suffice to explain why certain kinds of greatness
will flourish in these or those social circumstances and wither and die in others, it will
not explain why they arise in the first place – nor, as he adds, will such generalizations
explain the sheer contingencies  that  often affect  whether,  or  in what  way,  potential
greatness is realized. But, so far as I can see, again it doesn’t follow that “the causes of the
production of great men” must be a complete mystery, beyond the reach of scientific
explanation altogether – which leads us directly to Peirce’s researches on the subject.
⁂
14 Peirce had a long-standing interest in the phenomenon of great men.26 In 1859 he wrote
an “Analysis of Genius,” in which he argued against Dr.  Johnson’s definition – “large
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general powers accidentally determined in a particular direction” – and in favor of an
understanding of genius as involving, not “general powers” but special powers, and not
powers “accidentally determined” but inborn powers.27 (Apparently, however, he changed
his mind about innateness; for many years later we find him writing that “real power […]
is not born in a man; it has to be worked out.”)28 In 1860, reflecting in “Private Thoughts”
on “the inhumanity of a polemic spirit,” he had observed that we should still “revere a
great man notwithstanding his mistakes,” silently adding to and modifying his words as
necessary.29 Many years later, James’s “Great Men and Their Environment” would be the
subject of discussion at a meeting of the new Metaphysical Club that Peirce founded at
Johns Hopkins;30 and in the fall of 1883 Peirce began teaching a course at Hopkins on the
subject of great men.31
15 He would later  explain that  he had chosen this  topic  as  an appropriate medium for
“training  in  inductive  investigation,”  and specifically  of  the  application of  statistical
methods to phenomena where data are unavoidably imprecise and impressionistic. For
“it  was desirable,” he continues,  “to explode the ordinary notions that mathematical
treatment is of no advantage when observations are devoid of precision and that no use
can  be  made  of  very  inexact  observations.”32 The  class  began,  Peirce  reports,  by
constructing an impressionistic list of great men – “impressionistic” because it was based,
not on any analysis of greatness, but purely on the impression of greatness conveyed by
study of  a  person’s  life  and work:  a  list  originally of  almost  1,000 names,  eventually
whittled down to 288 – of which, to keep the task manageable, the class then considered
one of every six. Then each student in the class ranked these men, giving each a number
from 1 (the greatest) to 6 (the least great).33 The results – as Peirce illustrates by listing
the rankings for Bolivar, Julian, and Swedenborg – were remarkably close; and, he tells us,
there was no one on the list for whom the most extreme rankings differed by more than
2.  The ballots were then added,  and the mean value adopted as the “magnitude,” or
degree of greatness, of that person.34
16 Peirce’s retrospective reflection on this course focuses primarily on the methodological
question the class was intended to illustrate: the degree of objectivity possible in results
based on imprecise observations. But there is also a good deal to be learned from the lists
themselves, a selection of which is now published in volume 5 of the Writings. One list,
evidently informed by Peirce’s categories,35 distinguishes Men of Feeling (Firstness), Men
of Action (Secondnesss), and Men of Thought (Thirdness).36 And then, perhaps of most
interest  in  the  present  context,  there  are  the  questionnaires  that  Peirce  devised  to
systematize information about great men: their ancestry, family background, birth-order,
childhood,  precocity,  physical  stature,  peculiarities,  and  health,  sexuality, education,
work habits, drive, children if any, etc.;37 and the detailed answers filled in with respect to
Michelangelo, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and others. Michelangelo, we learn, “[i]dled at
school.  Would only draw. Began to draw as soon as he could use his hands,” worked
“very” long and “furiously” hard, had a “[g]reat memory” but an “[a]wful” imagination.”
38 Locke “[d]id not study much. Hated scholastic disputation. Discontented with Oxford”;
his  work habits  were “diligent” and “methodical  in the extreme”;  his  was an age of
“[t]ussle  with  tyranny.  Lax  morals.  Awakening  science.”39 Hobbes  was  “[n]ot  able  to
endure contradiction. Swore much. Undervalued all other men.”40 None of the three ever
married.  Etc.,  etc.  Though  Peirce  offers  no  generalized  statistical  conclusions,41 this
remarkable class exercise hints, at least, at how complex and multi-faceted a scientific
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understanding of (as James would have put it) “the causes of the production of great
men” would be.
17 Of course, when James and Peirce wrote about this question, the “blending” theory of
inheritance that Darwin took for granted had not yet been displaced by the Mendelian,
“particulate” theory (a scientific shift which didn’t take place until after Mendel’s ideas
were  rediscovered,  decades  after  he  had  published  them,  in  1900).42 And,  of  course,
neither James nor Peirce knew anything about DNA,43 let  alone about environmental
triggers of gene expression.44 Still, as I think about what current science might say about
great men and their environment, I am struck both by Peirce’s prescience, and by the
good sense of James’s resistance to simplified sociological determinism.
18 For a satisfying account would surely combine, as we would now say, both hereditary and
environmental causes, and would also acknowledge what we now know to be the very
complex interactions between heredity and environment. It would recognize an element
of randomness, perhaps even speak of a genetic “lottery.”45 It would also allow a role to
the contingencies that James stresses, which can create the opportunities for potential
greatness to manifest itself; or may stifle – or, as with an epidemic or a war in which a
budding genius dies – cut off such opportunities altogether; and which may significantly
affect the specific cast of a great man’s mind. (Peirce notes that Hobbes’s mother was so
terrified by the news that the Spanish Armada was fast approaching the coastal town
where she lived that  she gave birth to young Thomas prematurely:46 hence Hobbes’s
observation  that  he  and  fear  were  born  “twins”47 –  and  perhaps  also  his  later
preoccupation with the need for a state to ensure the safety of its citizens).
19 I suspect that such an understanding would also confirm the young Peirce’s conviction
that genius is more a matter of special powers than of generic brilliance; and the older
Peirce’s appreciation that, while the potential for greatness may be inborn, its actualization 
requires (both luck and) hard work – in his words, “peirceistence” and “peirceverance.”48
And I believe that, by revealing how many, and how complex, the relevant causal factors
are,  it  would confirm Nietzsche’s observation that “every man knows very well  that,
being unique, he will be in the world only once,” and that “no imaginable chance will for
a second time gather together in a unity so strangely variegated an assortment as he is”;49
and hence, also, warrant James’s resistance to the much too simple socio-deterministic
picture that he took to be all the sociology of his day had to offer.
⁂
20 Neither of James’s papers on great men is focused primarily on epistemological issues; but
the  full  title  of  the  earlier,  long  piece,  “Great  Men,  Great  Thoughts,  and  Their
Environment,” reminds us that James’s disagreement with Spencer and his admirers in
part concerns “the function of the environment in mental evolution.”50 Perhaps, James
writes, Spencer would be right to think of minds as “passively plastic” – if we were talking
only of  the minds of  dogs or horses,  or  even primitive humans.51 But  “[t]urn to the
highest order of minds,” he continues, “and what a change!” For here:
Instead of thoughts of concrete things patiently following one another in a beaten
track of habitual suggestion, we have the most abrupt cross-cuts and transitions
from one idea to another, the most rarified abstractions and discriminations, the
most unheard of combinations of elements, the subtlest associations of analogy; in a
word, we seem suddenly introduced into a bubbling cauldron of ideas […] [There]
will  be  sallies  of wit  and  humor;  […]  flashes  of  poetry  and  eloquence;  […]
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constructions of dramatic fiction or of mechanical device, logical or philosophical
abstractions, business projects, or scientific hypotheses […].52
21 James’s splendid depiction of this “bubbling cauldron of ideas,” of the vitality and the
fruitful idiosyncracies of the best minds and of the creativity and cross-fertilization they
make possible, hints very suggestively at the role “great men of thought” have played in
the  mental  life  of  the  human  race:  they  are,  we  might  say,  the  yeast  that  makes
productive intellectual ferment possible.
22 At first  blush,  James’s  preoccupation with “flashes of  genius  in the individual  head”
seems quite at odds with the markedly social character of Peirce’s theory of inquiry.53 For
as Peirce understands them, the concepts of truth and reality are intimately bound up
with the idea of a community of inquirers.  “The conception of reality […] essentially
involves the notion of a COMMUNITY,” Peirce writes in 1868; and “the [separate existence
of the] individual man is manifested only by ignorance and error.”54 In 1871, he offers a
nice illustration:
Suppose two men, one deaf, the other blind. One hears a man declare he means to
kill another, hears the report of the pistol, and hears the victim cry; the other sees
the murder done. Their sensations are affected in the highest degree with their
individual peculiarities […]. [B]ut their final conclusions, the thought the remotest
from  sense,  will  be  identical  and  free  from  the  one-sidedness  of  their
idiosyncracies.
23 And, he continues:
There is, then, to every question a true answer, a final conclusion, to which the
opinion of every man is constantly gravitating. […] Any truth more perfect than
this destined conclusion, any reality more absolute than what is thought in it, is a
fiction of metaphysics.55
24 Again, in manuscripts given the title “The Logic of 1873” by the editors of the Collected
Papers, Peirce writes: “Let any two minds investigate any question independently and if
they carry the process far enough they will  come to an agreement which no further
investigation will disturb.”56 In 1878, in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” Peirce gives his
now-famous definitions of truth and reality: “[t]he opinion which is fated to be agreed by
all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this
opinion is the real.”57 And fifteen years later he defends this account against Paul Carus’s
objections; now adding, however, that he never intended to suggest that we can be sure
that consensus will eventually be reached on every question, and that “[a]ll that we are
entitled to assume is in the form of a hope” that it will.58
25 Whether or not Peirce’s conceptions of truth and reality are, in the end, defensible, his
insight into the ways in which an individual inquirer’s weaknesses may be compensated
by others’ strengths is undeniably important. In a community of inquirers there can be,
not only division of intellectual labor – as when A’s theoretical speculations are tested
with the help of B’s experimental ingenuity and C’s facility with statistics, and so on – but
also  the  kind  of  mutual  compensation  and  correction  that  Peirce  envisaged:
complementary sensory, imaginative, or intellectual idiosyncracies; one over-emphasis
counteracting  another;  a  balance  of  more  conservative  members  of  a  scientific
community, patiently trying to modify an old theory in response to new evidence, and of
more radical members, eagerly jumping on the bandwagon of a new but as yet untried
speculation; and so forth.
26 But,  of  course,  this  kind  of  mutual  correction  is  possible  only  because  there  are
differences among individuals; it would be impossible if all inquirers had the same blind
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spots, the same sensory and cognitive weaknesses, the same intellectual strengths and
weaknesses, the same biases. Moreover – and now we see how Peirce’s logic of abduction
intersects  with  James’s  observations  about  “great  thoughts”  –  inquiry  begins  with
conjecture, informed guessing at possible explanations and laws: in short, with new ideas.
And so, while Peirce is quite right to stress that only in a community of inquirers will
there be the resources to correct the idiosyncracies and compensate for the weaknesses
of individuals, and so to extend evidential reach and encourage rigorous appraisal of
evidence, James is also right to stress that the source of the new ideas that will be tested
and sifted by the community is individual minds59 – and of great ideas, the minds of great
men.
⁂
27 And now I am reminded of the letter James wrote to Paul Carus after hearing Peirce’s
1898 Cambridge Conference lectures: “the whole thing [left] you with a sense that you
had just been in a place where ideas are manufactured”;60 and of Peirce’s complaint that
“[t]here is a kink in my damned brain that prevents me from thinking as other people
think.”61 Indeed: and but for that kink in Peirce’s brain philosophy would now be much
the poorer. The difference between one man and another,62 as James’s carpenter reminds
us, really is “very important.”
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12. For the present, I shan’t try to determine whether James’s interpretation of Spencer is, as
Fiske believes, “over-hasty.” Fiske, “Sociology and Hero-Worship” (note 000 above), 77. James
quotes Spencer’s The Study of Sociology (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1874) at some length –
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intellectual achievements.
49. Friedrich  Nietzsche,  “Schopenhauer  as  Educator”  (1874),  in  Untimely  Meditations,  trans.
R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983), 125-94, p. 127.
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The Differences that Make a Difference
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-1 | 2010
12
